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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, two fatal flaws of the cryptosystem which are based on the logistic map
and proposed by Y. Wang and T. Xiang are pointed out. According to this, cryptanalysts
could recover the plaintext by the chosen plaintext attacked in a short time. Therefore,
the authors propose a remedial improvement which can avoid the flaws and enhance the
security of the cryptosystem.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
0. Introduction
A chaotic dynamics system has some good features such as: sensitive dependence on initial conditions; ergodicity; cycle
tending to infinity. Under the control of certain parameters, we can obtain very good pseudo-random numbers. Therefore,
chaotic cryptography has aroused extensive concern, and many scholars have proposed their chaotic cryptosystem [1–
7] in recent years, such as Baptista’s chaotic cryptosystem which is based on ergodicity [2], and Wang and Xiang’s block
cryptosystems [3,4], which are based on a Logistic Map. However, there are still many problems in the practical application
of a chaotic cryptosystem, because some of the cryptographic algorithms take a long computing time and the length of the
ciphertext is likely to be several times longer than that of plaintext; and some of the cryptographic algorithms cannot assure
good security, which leads to a wide range of attacks. After successfully attacking the block cryptosystem based on Logistic
Map proposed byWang and Xiang [3,4], this paper presents a modified block cryptographic algorithm, and the study shows
that the improved algorithm is more secure than the original algorithm.
1. Brief introduction of T. Xiang and Y. Wang’s block chaotic cryptosystem
The key is the most important thing in block cryptosystems. Once the key is cracked, the cryptosystem will break down.
The cryptosystem proposed by T. Xiang and Y. Wang has some good features, such as fast encrypting and decrypting,
short key, and no statistical characteristic. The size of encrypted file is close to the original one. This cryptosystem uses the
logistic map
τ(x) = µx(1− x), x ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ [3.5699456, 4] (1)
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the scheme.
to generate pseudo-random number. When x ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ [3.5699456, 4], Eq. (1) is a chaotic dynamic system; Eq. (1)
sensitively depends on initial condition x0, and the iterative value {xi} of Eq. (1) is close to random. Expressing the value of
x in binary representation, we have
xi = b1(x)b2(x)b3(x) . . . bj(x) . . . , x ∈ [0, 1], bj(x) ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
As a result, a binary sequence Bnj = {bj(τ n(x))}∞n=0, where n is the length of the sequence and τ n(x) is the nth iteration of
the logistic map, can be obtained. The sequence is formed by all the jth bit of the x of the binary representation. Fig. 1 shows
how to encrypt data using the cryptosystem.
(1) Get the start point ω which denotes the real value of x from the last N0 transient time iterations, i.e., ω = τN0(x0).
(2) Divide the message PlainText into subsequences with length of L bytes, (in this paper using L = 8)
PlainText = p0p1 · · · pL−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω0
pL · · · p2L−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω1
p2L · · · . (3)
Let pj denote the value of jth byte. Get 8 bytes of plaintext pjpj+1 · · · pj+7 and combine them to form a binary message
block Pj.
(3) Based on themethod to generate binary sequences by iterating the logisticmap 70 times, obtain the binary sequences
B1i B
2
i B
3
i · · · B64i B65i · · · B69i B70i formed by all the third bits, i.e., i = 3 in Eq. (2). Divide the sequence into 2 parts, one is the front
64 bits Aj = B1i B2i B3i · · · B64i and the other is A′j = B65i · · · B69i B70i . Convert A′j into an integer Dj which is less than 64. This value
will be used to iterate the logistic map successively for Dj times after the current block has been encrypted. Now, we get the
key Aj and Dj.
(4) Permute the message block Pj with left cycles shift Dj bits to obtain a new message block P ′j .
(5) Perform the following manipulation with the sequences P ′j and Aj:
Cj = P ′j ⊕ Aj; (4)
where ⊕ denotes the XOR operation. As a result, the ciphertext block Cj for the message block Pj is obtained. Dividing
the ciphertext block Cj into 8-bit partitions, we obtain the ciphertext cjcj+1 · · · cj+7 of the plaintext bytes pjpj+1 · · · pj+1,
respectively. After Cj has been generated, we introduce two equations:
f (Cj) = cj + cj+1 + · · · + cj+7; (5)
D∗ = Dj + f (Cj) mod 64. (6)
(6) If all the plaintexts have been encrypted, the encryption process is finished. Otherwise, let ω = τD∗+70 and go to step 2.
The decryption process is almost the same as the encryption one. We only need to replace Eq. (4) with:
P ′j = Cj ⊕ Aj. (7)
After that, permute the block P ′j with right cyclic shiftDj bits to obtain the plaintext. Following the Eqs. (5) and (6), we can
obtain the D∗. Iterate the logistic map with D∗ times. Repeat these procedures until all the ciphertext has been decrypted.
2. The cryptanalysis and the attack of this algorithm
An attack of a cryptosystem means that cryptanalyst can obtain the plaintext without the key. In general, there are two
ways to attack the traditional cryptosystem:¬ the brute-forcemethod. A cryptanalyst constructs a vector space in the binary
sequence whose length is equal to the key to find out every possible key. If the length of the key is n, the capacity of the
space is 2n. ­ the cryptanalysis method. A cryptanalyst can obtain the key or plaintext by analyzing the characteristic of
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Fig. 2. Recover the first block of the ciphertext.
the cryptosystem. This method relies on the cryptographic algorithms and some pairs of the plaintext and ciphertext. This
paper can obtain the keys by analysis of the cryptographic algorithms.
Traditionally, an attack by a cryptanalyst consists of [8,9]:
(1) Ciphertext only. The cryptanalyst has access only to a collection of ciphertexts or codetexts. In this case, the
information is at a minimum. If poor information can deduce the plaintext, the cryptographic algorithm is fairly insecure.
(2) Known-ciphertext. The known-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has samples
of both the plaintext and its encrypted version (ciphertext) and is at liberty to make use of them to reveal further secret
information; typically this is the secret key.
(3) Chosen plaintext. A chosen-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis which presumes that the attacker
has the capability in choosing arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtaining the corresponding ciphertexts. The goal
of the attack is to gain some further information which reduces the security of the encryption scheme. In the worst case, a
chosen-plaintext attack could reveal the scheme’s secret key.
(4) Chosen ciphertext. A chosen-ciphertext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis in which the cryptanalyst chooses
a ciphertext and causes it to be decrypted with an unknown key.
Any cryptosystem which cannot resist the above attack is insecure.
The secret key of [3,4] actually is (µ, x0). The difference between [3,4] is that [3] does not consist of Eqs. (5) and (6). That
is the fatal flaw which leads to the same keystream if the secret keys are the same. The same keystream is easy to obtain
plaintext by analyzing the pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. Ref. [4] has proposed a scheme to remedy the fatal flaw, trying
to make the keystream depend on both the key and plaintext. This scheme adds Eqs. (5) and (6) into step 5. After using this
scheme, the keystream is dependent on key and plaintext except the first key. Based on this flaw, this paper proposes two
attack methods, which can obtain the keystream and plaintext.
Compared with the traditional block cryptosystem, the cryptosystem proposed by [4] eliminates statistics characteristic
of the logistic map and uses a simple algorithm. Attacking this chaotic cryptosystem via a common brute-force exhaustive
method costs a large amount of time and space. Hence, this paper chooses a cryptanalysis method to attack the scheme
which is proposed in [4]. Our chosen ciphertext attack is described below and illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3.
(1) Choose a special plaintext block PZ composed of all zeros, whose length is 64, and CZ is the corresponding ciphertext.
CZ is fairly important, because CZ is the first key of the keystream. We have
CZ = F(PZ ,D1)⊕ A1, (8)
where function F(A, B) indicates permuting A by a left cyclic shift B bits. As PZ is composed of all zeros, F(PZ ,D1) is equal to
PZ . Thus we have
CZ = F(PZ ,D1)⊕ A1 = 0⊕ A1 = A1. (9)
(2) Choose another special plaintext block PS , whose length is 64. PS is
PS = 0111 · · · 111︸ ︷︷ ︸
63
,
in binary representation. The first bit in PS is zero, and the rest are all one. CS is the ciphertext which is corresponding to PS .
We have
CS = F(PS,D1)⊕ A1, (10)
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Fig. 3. Recover the second block of the ciphertext.
and the A1 is already obtained. We get
CS ⊕ CZ = F(PS,D1)⊕ A1 ⊕ A1 = F(PS,D1). (11)
There is only one zero in the F(PS,D1) and we can find out its position easily. We know the D1 by analyzing the F(PS,D1)
and PS .
(3) Permute the following manipulation. C1 is the first block of the ciphertext.
P ′1 = C1 ⊕ A1. (12)
After that we obtain the first block of the plaintext by permuting the P ′ with right cyclic shift D1 bits.
(4) Compute the value of f (C1) by using Eq. (5).Whatever the plaintext is, if the secret keys are the same,D1 are the same.
f (C1) mod 64 = f (C ′1) mod 64. (13)
Construct a block PD∗1 whose length is equal to P1’s, and C
′
1 is the corresponding ciphertext to PD∗1 . Make sure the value
f (C ′1) mod 64 is equal to f (C1) mod 64 by increasing the value of PD∗1 . Actually we can obtain the same D
∗ by constructing
PD∗1 in order to synchronize the iterating times in a logistic map.
(5) Construct a new sequence PZ2, whose length is 64 more than PD∗1 . The front of the PZ2 is filled with PD∗1 and the last 64
bits are filled with PZ . Encrypt the PZ2, and find out the last block of the ciphertext. That is the key A2.
(6) Construct another new sequence PS2, whose length is 64 more than PD∗1 . The front of the PS2 is filled with PD∗1 and the
last 64 bits are filled with
PS = 0111 · · · 111︸ ︷︷ ︸
63
.
Encrypt the PS2, and find out the last block of the ciphertext, CS2.
(7) Permute the CS2 and A2 with XOR operation which is similar to step 3. After analyzing the result, we can obtain D2,
then we can recover the P2, the second block in plaintext. And then alter the value of the last block of PZ2 by increasing, until
the Eq. (14) is satisfied.
f (C2) mod 64 = f (C ′2) mod 64, (14)
if all the ciphertexts are recovered, algorithm will quit; if not, construct 2 new sequences whose lengths are 64 more than
before and go to step 5, till all the ciphertexts are recovered.
We have another improved algorithm by using the recovered block instead of the conflicting block. The first 3 steps are
the same as with algorithm 1.
(4) Obtain plaintext block P1 via A1, D1.
(5) Construct a new sequence PZ2, whose length is 64 more than P1. The front of the PZ2 is filled with P1 and the last 64
bits are filled with PZ . Encrypting the PZ2, find out the last block of the ciphertext. That is the key A2.
(6) Construct another new sequence PS2, whose length is 64 more than P1. The front of the PS2 is filled with P1 and the
last 64 bits are filled with
PS = 0111 · · · 111︸ ︷︷ ︸
63
in Fig. 4. Encrypting the PS2, find out the last block of the ciphertext, CS2.
(7)We can obtain a plaintext block P2 via A2 and CS22 . And then construct 2 new sequences whose length is 64more than
before. The last 64 bits of the two blocks are filled with PZ and PS individually. The fronts of the 2 new sequences are filled
with the entire recovered plaintext block. Repeating the procedure above, we can obtain the plaintext block P3.
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Fig. 4. Construct 2 new sequences.
Table 1
The first 2 blocks of the encryption of the plaintext ‘‘abcdefghijklnmopqrstuvwxyz’’ using (µ, x0) = (3.999995, 0.17777).
j Pj Dj Aj Cj
1 0×6162636465666768 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×97996a6c984e24c7
2 0×696a6b6c6d6e6f70 0×29 0×1a53363e031eb2b3 0×ac658109bb2a0786
3 – – – –
Table 2
Encryption of the plaintext PZ and PS with modified cryptosystem using (µ, x0) = (3.999995, 0.17777).
PlainText Dj Aj Cipher
PZ 0×0000000000000000 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f
PS 0×7fffffffffffffff 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×a2aa5b42a5751df0
Table 3
Trying f (E(PD∗1 )) using a brute-force method.
PD∗1 f (E(PD∗1 )) mod 64
0×0000000000000000 0×00000027
0×0100000000000000 0×00000025
0×0200000000000000 0×0000002b
– –
0×0800000000000000 0×00000017
If you want to recover the Cj, you have to recover the Cj−1. Construct two new sequences whose length is j blocks. The
first j− 1 blocks of the two sequences are filled with the entire recovered plaintext block. The last 64 bits of the two blocks
are filled with PZ and PS individually. Following the procedure above, we can obtain the plaintext block Pj.
In order to demonstrate the security loophole caused by the flaw, firstly, we encrypt a plaintext sequences,
‘‘abcdefghijklnmopqrstuvwxyz’’, via the key (µ, x0) = (3.999995, 0.17777). We fill the first 2 blocks of plaintext Pj, Dj,
Aj, and the corresponding ciphertext Cj into Table 1.
Encrypt the special plaintexts PZ and PS . Table 2 shows the result.
Recover the first block of the ciphertext: at first, deal with the ciphertext blocks CZ and CS which correspond to the
plaintext blocks PZ and PS . We can obtain A1 and D1. Put them into Eqs. (9) and (11), we have
CZ = A1 = 0× 5d55a4bc5a8ae20f,
CS ⊕ CZ = 0× fffffffeffffffff.
After analyzing the values, we know the D1 = 0 × 1f. With the help of A1 and D1, we can obtain the plaintext block
‘‘abcdefgh’’. From Eq. (5), we know f (C1) mod 64 = 0 × 00000017. We exhaust the permutation PD∗1 , trying to find out a
block PD∗1 which can satisfy the Eq. (13). Table 3 shows the procedure.
Recover the second block of the ciphertext: we find out that when PD∗1 = 0×0800000000000000, the Eq. (13) is satisfied.
We also obtain the C ′1 which corresponds to the PD∗1 . Construct two new sequences PZ2 and PS2 whose lengths are 2 blocks.
Make sure that the first block of PZ2 and PS2 are filled with C ′1 individually and the second block of PZ2 and PS2 are filled
with PZ and PS individually. Table 4 shows the details of the operations above. Consider CZ2 and CS2, the second block of the
ciphertext after encrypting the 2 sequences. We have
CZ2 = A2 = 0× 1a53363e031eb2b3,
CS2 ⊕ CZ2 = 0× ffffffffffbfffff.
We obtain D2 = 0×29 after analyzing the 2 values above.With the help of A2 and D2, we can recover the second block of
the plaintext, ‘‘ijklmnop’’. Deal with the second block of PZ2, and make it satisfy Eq. (14). Following the method of attacking
the second block of the ciphertext, we can recover all the plaintext.
X. Wang, C. Yu / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 57 (2009) 476–482 481
Table 4
Encryption of the plaintext PZ2and PS2 .
j PZ2 CZ2 Dj Aj PS2 CS2
1 0×0800000000000000 0×5d55a4bc4a8ae20f 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×0800000000000000 0×5d55a4bc4a8ae20f
2 0×0000000000000000 0×1a53363e031eb2b3 0×29 0×1a53363e031eb2b3 0×7fffffffffffffff 0×e5acc9c1fca14d4c
Table 5
Second block of the encryption of the plaintext ‘‘abcdefghijklnmopqrstuvwxyz’’ with modified cryptosystem using (µ, x0) = (3.999995, 0.17777).
j Pj Dj Aj Cj
1 0×6162636465666768 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×6dc9ed3375b836d6
2 0×696a6b6c6d6e6f70 0×29 0×1a53363e031eb2b3 0×9e8ea33dc0488073
3 – – – –
Table 6
Encryption of the plaintext PZ and PS with modified cryptosystem using (µ, x0) = (3.999995, 0.17777).
PlainText D1 A1 Cipher
PZ 0×0000000000000000 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×b7f8815e8eddf275
PS 0×7fffffffffffffff 0×1f 0×5d55a4bc5a8ae20f 0×48077ea171320d8a
Attack algorithm 2 is similar to attack algorithm 1, except themethod of constructing new sequences. In attack algorithm
2, the new sequence consists of all the recovered plaintext blocks and a special block. Using the recovered blocks can ensure
that the special block is encrypted by the same key. With this guarantee, we can analyze the corresponding Aj and Dj.
3. Analysis of the flaw and remedial improvement
Attack algorithm 1 adoptsa brute-force method to satisfy. Eq. (13). It means that we need to exhaust 264 permutations
because the length of each block is 64. So is the key. Due to the Eqs. (5) and (6), the complication is sharply reduced. The
space reduces from 264 to 64. Based on the theory of finite groups, the XOR operation is the simplest andmost effective way
to permute the order of the element in a group. After processing the Eqs. (5) and (6), the solution space is divided into 64
partitions with equal distribution. You can find out the values you need with less than 64 times computation. If we want to
attack the ciphertexts, we only need to guarantee that the keystream we obtain is the same as the encrypting one.
The cryptosystem proposed by [4] has some excellent benefits. It combines a chaotic map, block encryption and stream
encryption with less computation. But the two fatal flawsmake it not suitable to be applied widely for its security. Although
the keystreams depend on plaintext, the first key of the keystreams does not. According to this flaw, the cryptanalyst can
obtain the key from the first block. The other flaw is that the ciphertext has too much information, and the algorithm relies
directly on ciphertext. Therefore, the cryptanalyst can obtain the keys block by block, so it is easy to synchronize the track
of the chaotic map.
This paper proposes an improvement to remedy the flaws, via hiding D∗, decreasing the direct dependency between
algorithm and ciphertext. After step 5 in encryption, add Eq. (19). Meanwhile, in order to avoid the possibility of guessing
the original plaintext by trial shift and XOR using PZ and PS , we add functions f1(x) and f2(x) to make the ciphertext shift
uncertain bits. Now, the procedure of encryption can be described as follow:
f1 = (Aj + Dj) mod 64, (15)
C ′j = F(Cj, f1(Dj))⊕ Aj, (16)
D∗ = Dj + f (C ′j ) mod 64, (17)
f2 = (Aj + 2Dj) mod 64, (18)
C ′′j = F(C ′j , f2(Dj))⊕ Aj. (19)
Hence we can obtain D∗ directly from ciphertext. Though this improvement adds some computations, they are not time-
consuming operations. So this algorithm does not lose the original advantage. This improvement fixes the 2 flaws of the
algorithm and enhances the security of the cryptosystem. When we decrypt the ciphertext, we can see that D∗ only exists
in the decryption process.
Obviously, the direct dependency between algorithm and ciphertext has been eliminated. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the
efficiency of this remedy.
4. Conclusion
According to Refs. [3,4], two important things should be consideredwhen designing a chaotic cryptosystem. The first one
is to avoid the same secure key to generate the unchangeable keystream. The second one is to avoid using the algorithm
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which relies on the ciphertext directly, because it may help a cryptanalyst to trace the track of the chaotic dynamic system.
This paper analyzes the cryptosystem proposed by [4], and points out the 2 fatal flaws in it, finally remedies the flaws of
algorithm without losing the original benefits, and enhances the security of the cryptosystem.
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